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Between Kitchen Semiotics and the Privatised Public: How is the Personal Political in 
Art Today? 
 
The Agamben quote selected as the epigram for this conference describes private 
life as like the ‘stolen fox’ hidden under the boy’s clothes, that cannot be confessed 
to even while it tears at his flesh. What an extraordinary image this is by which to 
imagine our most private selves; alien and self-attacking, hidden and guilty, yet 
beautiful, precious and animal. Let’s try and keep this image in mind as we move 
through a few brief scenes in the last century of western autonomous art in order to 
extract something with the general usefulness of an aphorism from so many foxes 
under so many shirts. But we should also be aware of how, in the following 
paragraph, Agamben develops this cryptic image – he writes:  
 
It is as if each of us obscurely felt that precisely the opacity of our clandestine 
life held within it a genuinely political element; as such shareable par 
excellence – and yet, if one attempts to share it, it stubbornly eludes capture 
and leaves behind it only a ridiculous and incommunicable remainder. 
(xxi) 
 
To this caution we could add that not only is private life in the last instance something 
incommunicable, but that whenever it is shared it is always assimilated to another, 
often alien, purpose. Agamben, in The Use of Bodies, this momentous last instalment 
of his biopolitical saga Homo Sacer, gestures towards a utopian politics situated on 
the threshold between the public and private, the political and biographical, zoë and 
bios. In gesturing towards this, however, he always cautions how any such politics 
runs the dual danger of ‘making shipwreck’ in the private or, conversely, in attempting 
to externalise autobiography, of falling into ‘idiocy’. Here he alludes to our 
simultaneous living of life and its live-casting over social media, though he’d never 
deign to actually call it by its name. While Agamben has a tendency to render his 
concepts transhistorical, a tendency to find analogous forms across history, we can, I 
think, derive different, more directly political insights when we think of this 
politicisation of private life in historically dialectical terms – the effect of historical 
events upon each other. If we look at a direct historical sequence of events, however 
impressionistically, whilst applying his conceptual framework, we can witness how 
intimate, dissonant or confrontational expressions of private life by artists in 
modernity are continuously, and today more than ever, appropriated, commodified 
and put to use. 
 
In my book Art and (Bare) Life, I attempt to trace such a dialectic in relation to the 
interlinked development of biopower and autonomous art more broadly. I am 
interested in how the modern scientific and political conceptions of ‘life itself’ – life 
taken as an autonomous value – are immanent to biopolitical government and art’s 
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turn towards life, its vitalisation, corporealisation, or blurring with life. I track these 
two courses in order to think about how biopower, which works largely by way of a 
positive not negative or negating relation to life, finds such a transformed art 
extremely valuable and acts to assimilate and instrumentalise it for a variety of ends. 
This can be closely related to the danger Agamben points to in the stalled dialectics 
of private life’s politicisation, as well as to the stalled dialectic of 20th century avant-
garde art’s realisation as a praxis of life.  
 
For our task today however, I want to think more specifically about the relationship 
between different historical moments of the artistic engagement with what we are 
calling private life – but could also call the personal, lyrical or biographical – and those 
alien or external forces that structure, surround and devour such expressions the very 
same moment. Far from solitary beads strung on a necklace though, these moments 
of art history are more like the spirals of a corkscrew whose sharp end drives into an 
unknown future. There seems to be an equal and opposite motion, a double helix 
perhaps, between an art that gives representation to private life, often working 
towards abolishing the distinction between art and life, and those political and 
economic forces that aim to enclose and norm the interior life of capitalist subjects. 
Such power renders life-expressions useful to its programmes while using their vitality 
to bestow upon itself the appearance of something natural, spontaneous and life-like. 
This is certainly one way of thinking about the self-devouring aspect of the fox under 
our clothes. This othering of self can be illuminated further by reference to one of 
Agamben’s key conceptual pairs: the doubled term ‘form of life’ written with and 
without hyphens. The life of subjects, he argues, is continuously rendered a ‘form of 
life’, a way or style of living proper to an individual or group (bios) whose precondition 
is its biologically determining substrate (zoë). Here he gives the example of such 
figures as the HIV sufferer, the housewife, the refugee and the porn star. For of life 
without hyphens is the split and hence depotentiated relation between flesh and 
identity. To this Agamben rather confusingly contrasts the very same term ‘form-of-
life’, only this time the term is hyphenated, to express a life that is free of any such 
scission between its corporeality and its way of living. Form-of-life, written with 
hyphens, crucially factors thought into the relation between the way of living and 
individual embodiment, because it is only through thought, he argues, that one 
develops a use of oneself by which life’s defining potentiality is restored. For 
Agamben, it is only by restoring this potential to affect oneself, and “to be affected 
by one’s own receptivity” (210) that we can become a ‘form-of-life, in which it is never 
possible to isolate something like a bare life.” (211) This does indeed present a 
puzzling predicament for that art which potentiates life through self-affection, and in 
this very act seems to unfailingly produce new and labile surfaces for life’s assimilation 
into biopolitical forms of capitalist control. This is a predicament I hope to develop 
as I move through three art historical scenes: the subjectivism of early 20th century 
expressionism, the objectivism of the ‘60s and ‘70s ‘life performed’ genre, and the 
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contemporary genre of immersive artworks which reach deeply inside us, harnessing 
our psychobiological capacities in fully biopolitical, technologically enhanced ways.   
 
The first art historical scene I would like to address is that of early 20th century 
Expressionism and the ensuing Marxist debates of the 1930s that unfolded within the 
uneasy atmosphere of mounting European fascism. These debates most famously 
raged between the former friends and revolutionary communists Ernst Bloch and 
Georg Lukács over the allegedly hidden or disavowed solidarity that exists between 
Expressionism and fascism – debates which people are revisiting today with interest 
amidst what appears to be a contemporary return of fascist politics and its signature 
themes of racism, anti-immigrant fervour, paranoia and nativism. But how is it possible 
to imagine that the subjectivist nature of this movement could be accused of 
complicity with totalitarian societies and their tendency to, in Hannah Arendt’s words, 
‘annihilate the individual’? Herein lies the crux of the debate which was kicked off by 
anti-fascist cultural critics. Writing in left wing journals such as Das Wort and 
International Literatur, the likes of Bernard Ziegler and Georg Lukács claimed on the 
one hand that Expressionism, if taken to its logical ends, leads to fascism because it 
opens the door to a regressive atavism.  
 
The main argument levelled by this faction, many of whom advocated a neo-classical 
model of painterly social realism close to Hitler’s own preferred style, was that 
subjectivism is vulnerable to fascism because it abandons the Enlightenment project 
of reason and its attempt to produce knowledge systems adequate to the totality of 
capitalism, a feat best perfected by thinkers such as Hegel and Marx who had 
provided the Left with immense intellectual resources. Instead of dedicating art to 
the socialist cause by advancing objective representations of the world in the teeth 
of decadent bourgeois individualism, Expressionism’s critics accused it of rejecting 
any unified notion of the totality. Lukàcs described its conjunction of multiple 
perspectives, mixing of styles and periodicities as “junk clumsily glued together.” He 
also cautioned that “their creative method could without distortion be pressed into 
the service of that synthesis of decadence and atavism which is demagogy and 
Fascism.” While taking the diametrically opposed position, Ernst Bloch in his 1938 
essay ‘Discussing Expressionism’, does concede that expressionist painting can be 
accused of amorphousness, often remaining “incomprehensible to the observer” 
(26). Yet this incoherence is, for him, the risk and vulnerability exposed by those 
wanting to confront the totality of dominant social representations. “Any art,” Bloch 
wrote, “which strives to exploit the real fissures in surface inter-relations and to 
discover the new in their crevices, appears in Lukács’ eyes merely as a wilful act of 
destruction. [Lukács] thereby equates experiments in demolition with a condition of 
decadence.”(22) We should note here, then, that for Bloch social critique in this 
historical moment is connected with the aesthetic multiplication of subjective 
experiences and its displacement of consensual and unified representations. This has 
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the paradoxical effect, however, of turning the stakes of the argument inside out in 
order to claim that the putatively personal is nevertheless oppositional and thus de 
facto political. In this sense subjective expression is seen by both sides of the debate 
as serving a collective political purpose, whether fascist or emancipatory. 
 
Here we are reminded of how the terms of the debate established by Bloch in the 
1930s would later be reversed by art theorist Benjamin Buchloh who, in 1981, 
condemned the international resurgence of expressionism, the Neo-expressionist 
movement, as being culturally regressive due to its market-compatible 
misrepresentation of the generic nature of gestural painting as something uniquely 
expressive, where instead it is “a coded structure which cannot be an unmediated 
‘expression.’” (56) It seems important to add that the ‘80s return to large canvases, 
historical and psycho-sexual themes, and gestural painting developed largely in 
reaction to the complex and cool deconstructions of the personal that could be 
grouped under the feminist slogan, ‘the personal is political’ in the Happenings, 
Fluxus, Conceptual and Performance art of the 1960s and ‘70s. 
 
These post-war experiments in ‘performing life’, as Alan Kaprow called it, will serve 
as my second art historical scene for thinking through autonomous art’s relationship 
to private life. As with first-wave Expressionism, the artistic engagement of private life 
that we find in the art of this time inhabits a paradoxical topology. On the one hand, 
and progressively, the private ‘form of life’ (no hyphens) which artists acted upon and 
through in this moment was rendered something alien and converted into a general 
material upon which to perform a series of self-estrangements. The collective 
proposition was something like: ‘life as it is lived becomes the artwork, and through 
recursive receptivity the artwork opens this closed form of life to transformation’. In 
many ways this neo-avantgarde exploration of life pre-empts Judith Butler’s circular 
theory of (gender) identity as being a performance that produces the very referent to 
which it is made to refer; a circuit that can be opened up to different performances. 
On the other hand, and problematically, this act of bringing embodied life directly 
into public attention as the artwork also and involuntarily, we might say, produced a 
spectacular image of the artist as living an exceptional life. In rendering the artist’s 
life a medium of art making, this generation helped effectuate the hypostasis of the 
‘artistic life’ within an expanding consumer society. To illustrate this direction of travel, 
we can think of the shift in Marina Abramovic’s practice from her 1973 piece Rhythm 
0 in which she cedes control of her life to the audience for 6 hours as a way of making 
manifest the power relations in the room, compared to her 2012 work The Artist is 
Present, in which she offers up the hallowed aura of her artistic being to an endless 
tide of spectator-cum-pilgrims. I want to try and relate this transformation of ‘life 
performed’ from a critical gesture into an affirmative, market compatible one to the 
simultaneous transformation of social democracies, with their collectivised forms of 
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protection and social insurance, into the neoliberal society of individualised risk and 
self-reliance, and think about how private life is transformed in the process. 
 
But first, let’s look at some examples to get a deeper sense of this dialectic. In his 
1979 text ‘Performing Life’ Alan Kaprow introduces his proposal for an artwork with a 
recap of the Happening’s evolution, explaining how he wanted to make art without 
reference to pre-existing artistic genres or means. To this end he claims to have 
eradicated art media, contexts, audiences, plots, acting, repeated performances and, 
eventually readable scripts. In the absence of models, the attention and receptivity 
that are as essential to art as to Agamben’s fully potentiated form-of-life turns inward, 
focusing on largely unconscious activities which comprise everyday life, from 
breathing, to getting dressed in front of the mirror, to catching the bus. He explains: 
“When you do life consciously, however, life becomes pretty strange – paying 
attention changes the things attended to […] A new art/life genre therefore came 
about, reflecting equally the artificial aspects of everyday life and the lifelike qualities 
of created art.”(195) The proposition itself centred on focused attention on what is 
normally relegated as unconscious activity, especially breath, and conversely 
repressing, through recordings, headphones and amplifications, what might 
otherwise be natural objects of attention such as the sound of the ocean. Kaprow’s 
proposition is to scramble the codes of life as a continuous project of scrambling the 
codes of art, and vice versa.  
 
The self-alienating objectification of forms of life (no hyphens) through a retraining of 
attention onto private life during this period became a conspicuous activity for 
feminist artists and artists of colour. Martha Rosler’s 1975 video work Semiotics of the 
Kitchen and Chantal Ackerman’s 1976 film Jeanne Dielmann, 23 Quay de Commerce, 
1080 Brussels deliver us dissections of the occluded female domestic sphere reduced 
to a deadpan grammar. Here, in the aftermath of Abstract Expressionism’s 
celebration by the post-war consumer culture, we see a rejection of any expressionist 
shattering of the totality and an almost reverse image of a self that has been 
manufactured by totalistic social forms. This produces representations of the self as 
other, or othered by society. Expression is replaced by what we could call social 
abstraction; a patchwork of behaviours, objects, gestures and spaces which devolve 
upon a subject whose identity is merely an effect of social forces rather than a centre 
of agency and expression. Rosler’s blankly parodic demonstration of kitchen 
equipment confronts us with the deadeningly repetitive tasks of the housewife who 
she performs as seething with latent violence as she slices the air with a knife or stabs 
at a metal bowl with a chopper. In the closing sequences of the film she enacts the 
shapes of the letters U, V, W, X, Y with her arms and torso before jaggedly slicing the 
air with a knife to draw the letter Z. Embodiment of social codes stores up a residue 
that threatens to revolt; there is a stifled self in there somewhere. Ackerman’s 3-hour 
45 minute movie Jeanne Dielmann is a head-on, durational account of a single 
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mother’s domestic existence as a care-giver and prostitute. Ackerman has explained 
that she chose to cast the well-known and glamorous actress Delphine Seyrig as 
Dielmann because she wanted the viewer to watch what would otherwise be 
unwatchable. As Dielmann peels potatoes, massages mincemeat into meatloaf, lays 
the table and washes herself without love in real-time cinematic sequences, we live 
the repetition of her chores with her, become attentive to her skilful touch, suffer her 
unrecognised labours and reflect on our own. The film excavates the interiority of the 
viewer through the suffering durational experience of its subject. We are ‘freed’ from 
the action of narrative cinema to reflect on the architecture of our own lives which 
entrap us.  
 
These artistic renderings of private life into a legible grammar combine the exposure 
of life’s social construction with the prospect of its re-grammaticalization, the 
possibility of its being rewritten by that self-same life and those of others. This feels 
very close to Agamben’s utopian image of the politicised private life. Yet how does 
this apply to the black experience forged by the bloody history of plantation slavery 
for which the only subjectivity allocated by a racist society is one of objecthood? This 
is the contradictory existence suffered by the ‘commodity that speaks’, the ironic term 
Fred Moten has given to slave life. Here African American artistic deconstructions of 
being, in Fanon’s words, ‘an object among objects’ in the aftermath of the US civil 
rights struggles seem pre-armed against the pitfalls of the art/life genre’s assimilation 
to the spectacle of exceptional individuality. Amidst a predominantly white and male 
artworld, for instance, Adrian Piper’s paradigmatic ‘metaperformances’ experimented 
with the catalysis of states of consciousness which she deliberately induced but 
withheld from being directly shared. In her 1970 Performance for Max’s Kansas City 
she entered the super hip New York downtown nightclub wearing a black eye-mask, 
earplugs and gloves, in order to resist the co-optation of her consciousness into the 
‘art self-consciousness’ of the club. In her words, ‘I presented myself as a silent, secret, 
passive object seemingly ready to be absorbed into their consciousness as an object. 
[…] My objecthood became my subjecthood.’  
 
This last sentence seems to summarise something of this entire era of art-as-life 
experiments which had moved so far from Zola’s description of art as ‘nature seen 
through a temperament’, reversing it into something closer to ‘temperament 
deconstructed by art’. While for some, such as Abramovic, the use of the artistic life 
as an exemplar segued easily into the exemplarity of the life of the artist, for a female 
African American artist such as Piper the double consciousness required to hold this 
stance had a different history and a different aim. Although the auto-affective life 
performances of this period should generally be thought in relation to the struggles 
for civil rights and social equality that crucially form its context, nevertheless the black 
experience of being programmatically denied subjecthood creates a more complex 
doubling of the act of self-alienation as life performance. Piper’s embrace of 
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objecthood as subjecthood directly subverts the interiority that, arguably, Rosler and 
Ackerman’s works imply as a zone of hidden desire and latent fury; a coiled 
subjecthood that belies sexist objectification and can strike back with knives. 
Strangely, perhaps Piper’s work may come closest to Agamben’s utopian ‘form-of-
life’ in that she seems to reject the socially imposed scission between her zoë, or 
biology, and the life it apparently authenticates by embracing her reduction to a thing 
as a gesture of social defiance. My thingness, she seems to say, can become an object 
pointed at you and there’s nothing you can do to reach me.  
 
The representational precision of the personal as political that we find in these works, 
shares in the political empowerment and relative social equality that peaked during 
the late 1970s in the US and across Europe. As Melinda Cooper states in her recent 
book Family Values on the biopolitics of US welfare regimes and the social 
engineering of Fordist and post-Fordist populations, ‘By the 1970s then, the New 
Deal’s major social insurance program, Social Security, had expanded in quantitative 
terms to include both women and African Americans – Fordism’s non-normative 
subjects – and to keep pace with rising wages.’ She also explains how a succession 
of legal suits ‘repeatedly struck down the panoply of written and unwritten rules that 
had served to enforce sexual normativity throughout the Fordist era’ and the 
conditionality of its welfare regime. (122) The representational precision of both 
political and artistic deconstructions of white patriarchal capitalism during these times 
had unleashed, a general social amorphousness that terrified social conservatives 
who had discerned a connection between welfare democracy and the breakdown of 
the traditional family. They were storing up a neoliberal and socially conservative 
backlash the climax of which we are undoubtedly living through today. As we have 
seen, Bloch’s notion of exploiting ‘real fissures in the surface inter-relations’ in order 
to discover new possibilities is not an aesthetic activity restricted to a subjectivist 
genre. Yet if Expressionism levelled ‘amorphousness’ against a false totality, here we 
can see how the reverse strategy which aimed precision blows at the social 
production of identity can and did help to unleash the amorphousness that must 
come from experimenting with new forms of life. 
 
For many of these movements, political and artistic, non-identity was the utopian 
horizon they continuously tracked. Jonathan Katz explains how the sexual liberation 
movement above all elevated “not difference but commonality, indeed, universality 
to defining status”, so much so that by his account it “warred” with other social 
liberation movements in its quest, “to the point of attempting to erase embodied, 
biological differences.”(220) The progressive art politics of the ‘60s and ‘70s seem 
also to have attempted a passage through difference into commonality, moving from 
the precise deconstruction of identity’s syntax into the liberation of amorphous 
identity. However, the process has clearly made shipwreck in our current regime of 
ubiquitous identity specification, drifting far from any sense of a utopian end goal. 
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The enigmatic ‘smile without the cat’, as Foucault put it in relation to the happy play 
of emancipated sexualities, has turned into a cat without a smile. This, it seems to me 
can, at least in part, be explained by neoliberal capitalism’s ability to accommodate 
and reify non-normative identities within its expanded regime of credit-backed ‘asset 
welfarism’. In other words, its dismantling of the welfare state and collectivised forms 
of insurance was ultimately achieved in the ‘90s through the inclusion of women, 
queers and people of colour into regimes of debt from which they had formerly been 
excluded. Now able to access credit, those without social power or wealth were 
ejected from welfare dependency into the ‘ownership society’, a mass migration that 
stored up the subprime crisis and its austere aftermath. Today we have a combination 
of individualised risk, precarity and weakening social representation to which the 
increased presence of ‘minorities’ within the spaces of culture, and to a lesser degree 
the political realm, seem to pose little threat. The efficiency of neoliberalism’s 
siphoning off of collective wealth to the 1 percent via a waiving of taxes for the rich, 
the privileging of family inheritance over social ownership and attacks on progressive 
forms of social redistribution has seen the public sphere sold off and hollowed out. 
The reciprocal image to this is the increased subsumption of our self-relation, our 
sexuality, our creativity and private life into market exchangeable goods. This internal 
space excavated by progressive identitarian art and politics has come to provide 
some of the principal surfaces for speculative value extraction within late capitalism.  
 
I want to turn, finally, to a scene that can hopefully give a clear sense of how the 
dialectic of power and resistance is legible in artistic treatments of private life today. 
As the biotech industry and data capitalism discovers the infinite plasticity of 
biological and social life, the life/art genre is darkly following suit. There is a prevailing 
tendency towards the use of immersive environments, re-enactments, fictioning, live 
action role play (LARPs) or real game play (RGPs), and what the art collective OMSK 
Social Club call ‘bleed’ between life and game. There is an appetite to explore and 
critique the paper-thin interface between our habitual sense of reality and a ‘lucid 
world of play’ (OMSK). The artistic interest in these mutative experiences comes at a 
time of capitalism’s programmatic blurring of the distinction between materiality and 
simulacral hyperreality – in the culture industry, the military-industrial complex, life 
science and medicine, and the algorithmically driven financial markets. One of many 
questions we might pursue here is how these breaches seem to entail a crude divorce 
of mind and body on the one hand, and a subtler remapping of self-relation 
continuous with life’s reflexive relationship to thought? We are suspended between 
forgetting and mutating the flesh. 
 
Immersive projects, which have become the order of the day, seem equally to dwell 
in this uncertain zone. Here we can think of Jeremy Deller’s 2001 historical re-
enactment of the 1984 Battle of Orgreave, a pitched battle between striking miners 
and police in which some of the historical participants were made to replay this 
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chapter in their own lives. Or Ed Fornieles’s 3 day LARP from earlier this year, 
involving 10 participants enacting an alt-right online gamer group who meet-up IRL 
and which purportedly investigates the construction of masculinity. The participants 
are ‘released’ from the rules after the first two days and, surprise surprise, don’t know 
how to return to their own identities. And finally the OMSK Social Club’s darkside 
rave-cum-LARP’s which flirt with real life game-play’s bleed into everyday existence. 
In the words of OMSK, ‘reappropriating life allows the human mind to be disrupted 
and brought into the state of the uncanny, enabling it to hack its common nodes of 
perception and identity.’ But who is doing the reappropriating here? It seems clear 
that there is a shift from artists’ deconstructions of auto-biography to contemporary 
artists’ more direct and manipulative experimentation with the internal state of 
participants, drawing upon their psychological and somatic capacities to produce 
contagious states of altered reality. The audience become what Foucault calls, in 
relation to human capital, ‘abilities machines’ that serve as material for the artwork, 
and they seem to be inclined to participate because the reality effects of these works 
are spellbinding. To conjure Agamben’s terminology again, this strikes me as a case 
of the stalled self-affection of life by thought, in that these works hijack the receptivity 
of living beings but suspend its capacity for self-affection. Receptivity, which is linked 
to life’s plasticity, is divorced from the life it resides within. 
 
It seems clear that the invasive over-presence of immersive artworks is a reflexive 
response to the hollowing out of the self by digital neoliberal capitalism. When every 
move we make can be data-tracked and commodified as much as our personal 
conduct used to peg our position on the fluctuating human capital index, calculating 
on one’s self-relation and personal behaviour has become the ultimate target of 
contemporary power and the sweet spot of value creation. For this reason the 
assertion of minoritarian identity is no longer necessarily a challenge to hegemony, 
but a niche within an endless spectrum of market augmentations. Art, as always, 
dwells within these social forces and relations of production, and just as 
expressionism and fascism emerged as responses to industrial capitalism, 
hallucinatory experiments in identity morphing have emerged on the cusp of 
capitalism’s arrival at the new frontier of speculation on ‘life itself’. Yet the crude 
abandonment of care for participants’ freedom of experience, the Dionysian crashing 
of their mechanisms of self-control and self-recognition seems to me to signal a new 
type of amorphousness within the artwork. This is no longer the rejection of false 
totalities, as in expressionism, nor the prospect of life liberated from biopolitical 
specification, as glimpsed in the art/life genre, but the amorphousness rendered by 
a new appreciation of life’s plasticity. Mutation is not the slow emergence of natural 
evolution and ontic self-affection, but capitalism’s programmatic drive. As with credit 
markets, diverse identities are not included so much as rated, seen as the sum of their 
capacities and abilities, not as the nucleus of their own emanations. 
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The reduction of the individual to a hackable lucid gamer is reminiscent, for me, of 
Hannah Arendt’s description of totalitarian regimes who work through the destruction 
of individuality. “For to destroy individuality is to destroy spontaneity, man’s 
power to begin something new out of his own resources, something that cannot 
be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events” The reliance 
of these sensuously seductive and engulfing works on our psychobiological 
receptivity, which must necessarily freeze the spontaneity of thought in order to 
take full-effect, are locked into the self-same biopolitical logic they claim to 
disturb or disrupt. It is now the spectator’s experience of their own vitality and 
self-relation which becomes profoundly amorphous and thus depotentiated. 
Through this uncanny misrecognition of the self, our interiority can seem quite 
impersonal. The life-hack these works perform, then, is ultimately analogous to 
the datasets formed by surveillance capitalism that congeal around our everyday 
behaviour, modelling it in order to predict, influence, model and control it. Here 
I am left wondering whether this is the fox under our clothes that has become 
entirely hostile, or whether it is in fact a quite different animal who we mistake for 
ourselves. 
 
